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Past and Future Challenges
he subject of this conference—innovation and monetary 
policy transmission—is something that has naturally 
concerned me over the years. Historically, the issue has 
appeared in somewhat different guises. I never thought I had 
really adequate answers, but somehow the system has worked. 
Moreover, I am afraid that as far as current technological and 
financial innovations go, I should be listening rather than 
speaking. I am not a big user of new technologies. My main 
experience with technology as president of this Bank and then 
as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board was asking why staff 
needed new computers every four years. I always had the 
feeling that capacity was expanding exponentially over time, 
but I did not know that monetary policy was becoming any 
better!
Nonetheless, I believe you are onto an intriguing subject. 
Indeed, some of the topics covered in your papers remind me 
of questions I have thought about before. For example, when I 
was here and when I was in Washington in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, we embarked on some new approaches to 
monetary policy that depended upon control of money by the 
means of quantitative control of the reserve base.
I can remember tossing and turning at night thinking 
whatever we do, the banks will try to game us. Could they use 
the same reserves to satisfy our reserve requirements at the end 
of the day and satisfy the reserve requirements in Asia and in 
England? Would the result be an inability to control the 
effective money supply through U.S. reserve policy? I see from 
one of your papers that the issue of how globalization may 
affect policy transmission has not gone away, so I guess my 
sleepless nights were not entirely misguided.
In preparing for this talk, I read two earlier papers on the 
topic of innovation and monetary policy, one by Ben Friedman 
and the other by Mike Woodford. They are both intriguing and 
reassuring in two respects: First, I am not the only person 
worrying about the subject of monetary control, and second, 
while the technical details may be different, the underlying 
concerns of how to conduct monetary policy in the face of 
innovations have not changed that much. So rather than trying 
to look too far into the future, I thought it might be useful to 
talk about my own experiences in previous periods of 
structural change and innovation during my career at the 
Federal Reserve.
I literally have been around the Federal Reserve for more 
than fifty years. I wrote my senior thesis on Federal Reserve 
policy in 1949. From then until at least the last few years, I have 
been more or less directly involved with the Fed. I have always 
liked one piece of philosophy by Yogi Berra. He said you can 
observe quite a lot just by watching, and I have done quite a lot 
of watching of the Federal Reserve. So it might be of some 
passing interest to share the observations I have made over a 
period of fifty years. And if nothing else, it will give you some 
reassurance that the kinds of problems you are worried about 
are not exactly new, although they certainly come in different 
packages.
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I remember when I wrote my thesis that the historic, never 
fully resolved intellectual argument over central banking was 
between the so-called currency school and the banking school, 
with its real-bills doctrine. Those schools of thought have gone 
through several permutations and combinations since then, 
but the substance of the argument remains the same: Is it 
money or credit that is important? I would also tell you that 
fifty years ago, I remember very well, there was a lot of concern 
about the effectiveness of monetary policy.
At the time, the United States had just finished going 
through the long depression of the 1930s, which, from the 
standpoint of monetary policy, was somewhat similar to the 
experience in Japan now. There was the perception of a 
liquidity trap. There was a real question whether, under the 
circumstances, monetary policy was worth worrying about. It 
seemed helpless. Fiscal policy was the king of the day and that 
carried over into the postwar period when interest rates were 
frozen. I remember well that the New York Fed struggled with 
that problem when I was a young fellow here. (Actually, my 
conclusion in my college thesis, which I had forgotten about 
until some student reminded me later, was that monetary 
policy was so impotent that we ought to just let the Treasury 
handle it.)
Back then, there was very heavy political pressure to keep 
interest rates stable, and that was the driving responsibility of the 
Federal Reserve for many years—not just during World War II, 
but after. By the time I had actually arrived here in 1951, the so-
called Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord allowed the Federal 
Reserve to move interest rates freely. But the Fed was not about 
to move them very far.
The idea that was promoted by this particular institution at 
the time was something called the availability doctrine. Bob 
Roosa, a name that may resonate with some of you, was the key 
economist here and an ingenious analyst of monetary policy. 
He developed the idea that interest rates did not need to move 
very much to be effective; it would in fact be dangerous to move 
them very much because of the heavy, excessive overhang of 
government securities in the hands of the banks, most of which 
was fairly long-term debt. He proposed that the Federal 
Reserve could take advantage of the situation by implementing 
a very small increase in interest rates, which, as we all learned 
in Economics 101, would push down the prices of assets on 
bank balance sheets. That would so disturb the banks that they 
would refuse to liquidate any securities because they would not 
want to report losses. Therefore, they would have to restrain 
their lending activity. And that would be the mechanism by 
which Federal Reserve policy would be effective.
The mechanism obviously relied upon a market imper-
fection, which I do not think was totally unrealistic at the time, 
but it was not lasting. At the end of World War II, banks were 
loaded with government securities and there was a big question 
of how they would react to even a relatively small decline in the 
securities’ value.
I should point out that during the same period, we did not 
just think about monetary policy and fiscal policy. It was 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, and debt management. As 
unlikely as it sounds today, debt management was considered 
to be an active “third leg” of policy. In 1953, the Treasury got 
aggressive and issued some thirty-year bonds—the “3¼s of 
78-83.” The Treasury market was somewhat disturbed, and the 
economy went into a recession. Whether the Treasury’s 
aggressive debt issuance was a contributing factor was much 
discussed, and a long argument ensued about whether the 
Federal Reserve should intervene directly by conducting open 
market operations in the long-term market or whether such 
intervention should be left to debt management, with the Fed 
operating with “bills only.” While we all know how that 
discussion ended, the debate at the time clearly centered on 
whether monetary policy could be effective independent of 
debt management.
In the 1960s, I moved from the Federal Reserve to the 
Treasury Department. At the time, we faced what was 
perceived as a dilemma for debt management and monetary 
policy. We had a trade surplus, but the balance-of-payments 
deficit probably ran as much as $2 billion or $3 billion a year. 
This was a matter of some considerable concern around the 
world, since it raised questions about whether our low interest 
rates and capital outflow would determine the role of the dollar 
in the world economy. Bob Roosa had preceded me in moving 
from the Federal Reserve to become Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs. In response to this situation, he 
helped develop what was called Operation Twist: the Treasury 
would retire long-term securities and issue short-term 
securities based on the theory that it was the short-term rate 
that was relevant for international capital flows, while long-
term rates were more relevant for the domestic economy, 
mainly because they affected the mortgage rate.
Well, to the extent that Operation Twist worked at all—and 
I must confess I was a little skeptical about it, given the fluidity 
of markets even then—it too depended on some degree of 
market imperfection. And I think it became apparent fairly 
quickly that the market imperfection was not as great as had 
been assumed.
Instead, a quite different imperfection was imposed on the 
market, and it was not ineffective at all. Regulation Q, which 
placed a ceiling on commercial bank interest rates, became in 
practice the “hammer” of Federal Reserve policy. The restraints 
on interest rates that banks could pay may have dropped from 
recent memory, but suffice it to say that Reg Q’s major 
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permitted and 2) there was a hard ceiling on interest rates on 
time deposits of all types, including savings deposits. Further-
more, commercial banks’ liabilities were the dominant 
financial savings instrument at the time. When interest rates 
went up and impinged upon the interest rate ceilings, the 
commercial banks could not raise money. They pulled back on 
lending, particularly mortgage lending.
 Reg Q worked with extreme force, I think it is fair to say. 
When interest rates rose above the ceilings, you had a recession, 
and the recession was concentrated in the housing sector. Reg Q 
therefore became a matter of political concern as well as 
economic concern because of the concentration of its impact.
By the time we got to the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
inflation had picked up a lot of steam and was pushing interest 
rates progressively higher. Restiveness about the Reg Q 
structure came to a head and the interest rate ceilings were 
gradually removed. In fact, the effectiveness of Reg Q was partly 
removed by the actions of banks themselves in developing 
other techniques for raising money.
So by the late 1970s, we felt that if we wanted to control 
inflationary pressures, we were left with having to follow the 
advice of Anna Schwartz and others: we should carefully 
control reserve growth, which, via open market operations and 
the fulcrum of reserve requirements, should limit the 
expansion of bank deposits and credit. Whether or not one 
believed in the strict interpretation of the “monetarist” 
theories, the operational relationship between reserves and 
money, however measured, was direct. Controlling reserve 
growth was one way to slow money growth and get some 
restraining influence on the economy. And I think it is fair to 
say that eventually we did get a restraining influence.
The problem, of course, is that it took a very high level of 
interest rates to get that restraining influence. Al Wojnilower, 
who was observing all this from outside, was one of the first to 
point this out, and he turned out to be absolutely right. I do not 
think that any of us embarking on this policy felt we were going 
to end up with bank lending rates at 21 percent in the United 
States. I think that happened because people dependent upon 
bank lending did not follow a nice conceptual textbook 
approach and say, “the interest rate is a little higher, so we’ll 
pull back a little bit.” They were caught up in ongoing 
operations; they were caught up in planned investment 
programs; they were caught up in their habitual methods of 
operation. So they kept borrowing and implicitly thinking, 
“well, this interest rate is awfully high today, but maybe it will 
come down tomorrow, so we’ll keep at it.” And the credit 
expansion continued until, to exaggerate a little bit, this 
became a policy of restraint by bankruptcy. If you keep 
tightening policy until borrowers and lenders really cannot 
stand it anymore, you begin to have a real degree of restraint on 
the economy and on prices. And indeed, we had a real degree 
of restraint, and inflation came down.
The economy was affected by direct controls as well.
I neglected to mention earlier that direct controls on credit 
extensions were a favored instrument of monetary policy in the 
late 1940s and 1950s. When I wrote my untitled, uncompleted 
thesis for my Ph.D. (which I understand I am still eligible to 
receive if I ever complete the thesis), I contrasted the use of 
direct controls on credit in the United Kingdom with direct 
controls in the United States and how they operated (or did 
not) in a market system. But I do not want to gloss over the fact 
that we had a little experiment with direct credit controls as late 
as 1980 during the Carter Administration. We designed what 
we thought was a modest, market-mimicking restraint on some 
parts of consumer credit. This was something we anticipated 
would have a modest restraining effect on the economy, 
supplementing our control over reserves. It turned out to have 
a huge psychological effect. I never saw anything like it. There 
was a sharp reaction by consumers that single-handedly drove 
the economy into recession in a matter of weeks. I believe that 
was the last time there was any experimentation in direct 
control of credit.
Since the early 1980s, I think it is fair to say that we have 
returned to a kind of approach that relies upon direct influence 
on the short-term interest rate and a much more fluid market 
situation that allows policy to be transmitted through the 
markets by some mysterious or maybe not so mysterious 
process. I think we have found two important “transmission 
belts”—domestic asset prices (particularly the stock market) 
and the exchange rate—that were not considered to have much 
importance earlier. I think we also know that relationships 
between monetary policy and stock prices and between 
monetary policy and exchange rates are not the most 
predictable relationships that exist in the economy. We have 
certainly seen demonstrations of that recently. I was a little bit 
bemused by the reports in the press recently that the euro 
declined because the European Central Bank did not reduce 
interest rates, which is not what you consider the normal and 
predictable reaction to monetary policy.
 I think this caution helps demonstrate the importance of 
central banks having a clear and unambiguous decision-
making process when they operate in much more open and 
fluid markets, if market responses are to be predictable. Indeed, 
you sometimes might ask the question whether the Federal 
Reserve is driving asset prices and the exchange rate or whether 
the exchange rate and asset prices are driving the Federal 
Reserve. That is an uncomfortable question to ask when you 
are trying to run a central bank.
So now we look ahead and the markets are getting ever more 
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what is the result of running the world on fewer and fewer 
reserves (which, in the United States, we apparently no longer 
try to control anyway). Moreover, the commercial banking 
system and bank deposits are getting progressively smaller as a 
part of the financial system.
So what happens? From my recitation of this history, I think 
it seems clear that both the market and the political system will 
always try to game the Federal Reserve and find ways of getting 
around restraint. Nobody likes restraint. Everybody likes the 
stock market to go up forever and the economy to go up 
forever. When the central bank tries to restrain, the natural 
instinct is to find some way around it, to find money substitutes 
and new political instruments less directly under central bank 
influence. If they cannot find the way economically, they will 
look for it politically, which presents another problem. It is also 
very clear from history that whatever changes in procedures 
and policy are made today will cause changes in the market 
system tomorrow, as the market adapts to what you have done 
and tries to find a way around it.
Despite those efforts and those changes, a simple obser-
vation suggests that monetary policy is still pretty potent. In 
fact, the 1990s, as you all know, have been regarded as the great 
glory days of monetary policy. There is a sense of conviction in 
the market that we can press a few monetary buttons and 
everything will be solved.
Of course, that is an illusion. The most recent events have 
undermined that impression to some degree. Nonetheless, 
monetary policy here, and to some degree elsewhere, has 
achieved an almost mystical status. You wonder whether it has 
any real substance at all, or whether it is all shadow.
I am reminded of the comment by Denis Robertson, a well-
known economist of the 1930s, when he described some 
monetary phenomena by referring to the story of the Cheshire 
Cat in Alice in Wonderland. The cat disappeared, and all you were 
left with was the grin, but the grin was all that was necessary.
I think that reference is entirely fitting because you have to 
wonder whether anything more is necessary these days than a 
pronouncement that the Federal Reserve would like to change the 
federal funds rate by x percent. The Fed does not actually have to 
do anything. The rate will immediately change by x percent.
Will it stay there or not? Well, I think the market is still 
dependent upon some action by the Federal Reserve. Sooner or 
later, there has to be some intervention. But I think this is a 
basic question that we are grappling with at this conference, 
and one that I believe we will continue to debate for some time.
When I think about what the central bank ultimately 
controls, I am led to thinking about what functions of the 
central bank cannot and will not be taken over by the other 
operators in the financial markets, either individually or 
collectively. Market participants certainly sit around 
ingeniously thinking of how to intermediate and satisfy every 
possible demand for liquidity and credit at the lowest possible 
cost. So it seems to me—and I say this with some 
tentativeness—that the market is going to try to minimize the 
use of “base” money, the one thing the Fed controls. If no 
interest is paid on base money, market participants will try to 
minimize the need to hold reserves or currency, or develop 
other payment systems, once again trying to work around any 
constraint set up by the central bank.
So what is left for the central bank to control? I think the 
market is still a long way from doing without currency or 
reserves as a means of interbank payments. At the end of the 
day, it is only the central bank as an institution that can satisfy 
our demand for currency and create or withdraw reserves, and 
therefore provide a sense of liquidity in the markets. In the 
extreme case, it can create liquidity without end, since there 
will be no question about its credit status. In most circum-
stances, that power does give the central bank special influence, 
both through its actions and through its potential influence; 
markets respect this, and will therefore respond to the 
intention of policy.
This seems to me to be the last strand of permanence in 
central banking. Of course, influence over liquidity does not 
provide any assurance that you will use that influence wisely or 
that the transmission belt to the economy is going to be 
obvious and direct. Operating monetary policy in open, liquid 
markets means that the transmission belt will inevitably be 
unstable: the market in effect is competing with you, and the 
central bank will find it necessary to adjust. All of the history I 
have recounted suggests that this will be a continuing struggle. 
A fixed rule cannot solve the problem. I think that is the lesson 
of the past fifty years. Those fifty years also offer some hope that 
central banks will not be inconsequential, even if they have to 
adapt their modi operandi constantly.
I want to leave you with one other thought, which may make 
some central banks inconsequential. What is the endgame in all 
of this, of open markets: the free flow of capital around the 
world, a couple of hundred independent countries, some big, 
some small? I think the logical long-term result—extending far 
beyond my living horizon, but perhaps not yours—is a world 
currency. With a world currency, we will not have a lot of 
independent central banks. What I have not quite figured out is 
what the one remaining central bank will do, what instrument it 
will use, and how it will be controlled. But I think that is the 
direction in which economic and financial logic guides us.
I suspect there will be a lot of way stations along the road to 
a world currency. For example, I am pretty sure we are going to 
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have many fewer currencies. In such an environment, will we 
have a few large central banks centered around big countries 
and monetary centers, each with some influence, but with their 
interrelationships guided, influenced, and affected by the 
exchange rate between them? Such a structure leaves open a lot 
of questions about the organization of the world economy in 
ways unrelated to central banking. Nevertheless, I think that if 
the net result of that kind of a world is very widely fluctuating 
exchange rates between the major centers, then it will not be a 
world conducive to the kind of multilateral open trading 
system and political harmony that we like to associate with the 
benign leadership of the United States and its partners during 
the postwar period.
So I will leave you with that thought, confident that you will 
not be able to disprove it to me, in my lifetime anyway. That is 
the safest kind of projection to make.
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